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THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
IN ARGENTINA 
David Slomsky 
Introduction 
In fewer than five years, Argentina has 
made an incredible economic turnaround from 
a state of economic instability to that of 
arguably more growth potential than any other 
country in the world. However, many aspects 
of the economy have been unable to advance 
with such a rapid progression of economic 
rebuilding. Technological development in 
Argentina has not been a concern of the gov-
ernment in over fifty years and was not a con-
cern in the recent redevelopment of the 
Argentine economy. Yet, a strong technologi-
cal infrastructure is an essential part of any suc-
cessful economy, and building one will now 
have to be a primary concern for the Argentine 
government. 
As can be surmised from Argentina's his-
tory of technological policies, Argentina has 
developed an adaptation strategy rather than a 
creation strategy for technological development. 
This means that Argentina imports products 
from other countries and then adapts them to 
Argentine customs and needs, such as by 
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redesigning the inside of refrigerators to con-
form to the habits of society. Argentine engi-
neers have also tried to improve the efficiency 
and quality of many of the products that are 
imported. (Carelli) This strategy has developed 
for two main reasons. First and foremost, it is 
much cheaper for Argentina to purchase tech-
nology than to develop it, especially since the 
country has no strong technological base from 
which to start. This strategy has been comple-
mented by the fact that the world's informational 
infrastructure is becoming much more open. 
Second, a good technology policy is not as essen-
tial to turning around an economy as it is to 
maintaining an already established economy. 
Argentina must address many considera-
tions in order to build its technological infra-
structure. The first is the need to set up 
research organizations that will initiate and 
encourage the progress of technological devel-
opment. Second, strong policies are required 
to govern these new research organizations. 
Finally, good communication is needed among 
the parties concerned with the development of 
technology, including the government, 
research organizations and the industries them-
selves. Most of the research organizations in 
Argentina today were developed many years 
ago; however, there have been no strong gov-
erning policies and little communication 
among the research organizations, the govern-
ment and the industries. 
It is now necessary to define what is 
required by new technology policies in order to 
develop a firm foundation. To begin with, there 
are three ways in which a country gains tech-
nology. One is to simply transfer technology 
from other countries, which can be done 
through a variety of different means. Secondly, 
a country can gain technology through its own 
research and development, whether by private 
enterprise or the government. A third way is 
for a country to combine information obtained 
from foreign countries with its own domestic 
technology. New technology policies in 
Argentina must address concerns such as 
financing of organizations and providing incen-
tives for companies to utilize national technol-
ogy development techniques. 
In this paper I will explore the ways in 
which Argentine policies concerning both the 
development and transfer of technology must 
change to establish a more productive techno-
logical infrastructure. I will begin by examin-
ing the problems encountered with past poli-
cies. Then, I will explain how the current 
developmental policies and organizations are 
being integrated into one fluid system. Finally, 
I will discuss how Argentine companies are bet-
ter transferring technology from other coun-
tries to integrate with their own domestic 
research and development. 
History of Argentina's Technology 
Policies 
The key to understanding both Argentina's 
problems with the development of technology 
and what must now be done to generate a new 
technology infrastructure lies in examining the 
past. Many of the problems in the technology 
domain stem from a lack of interest in the field, 
due mainly to the country's political and eco-
nomic instability. This lack of interest, char-
acteristic of both the government and industry, 
led to inadequate university training, poor com-
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munication and weak state policies. There was 
also very little active research being performed 
by either the state or private entrepreneurs, and 
a lack of incentives for potential research of new 
technology by the government. Finally, no real 
network of agencies or classification systems 
for technology regimes ever developed. (Nelson, 
p. 451) Although attempts have been made to 
overcome some of these problems, in the end 
there has not been enough interest shown by 
government or the industry to support the 
needed changes. 
Beginning in the mid-1930s and continu-
ing into the 1940s, Argentina, like many other 
developed economic nations at the time, was 
beginning to develop programs and organiza-
tions that would generate technology and look 
toward the future. These organizations, how-
ever, were few in number and had little contact 
with the industries themselves. For Argentina, 
the 1950s was the time when the technology 
developmental organizations flourished. CNEA, 
INTA, INTI and CONICET, organizations to be 
discussed later, were all formed between 1951 
and 1958. (Adler, pp. 105-108) 
However, the boom in the formation of 
technology organizations did not coincide with 
the domestic developmental technology poli-
cies. During the 1950s and early 1960s there 
was a desire for a strong anti-dependency pro-
gram - a program in which the government 
imposes strict importation laws on technology 
transfer into the country to stimulate the 
advancement of domestic technology develop-
ment. The industries at this time were growing 
so much faster than the support for domestic 
technology that a laissez-faire policy was the 
most effective and most natural plan to devel-
op. Instituting laissez-faire policy ensures that 
the government will have very little control 
over the importation of technology and there-
fore allows foreign companies to invest in the 
country, bringing with them their previously 
developed technology. (Adler, pp. 105-108) 
After a small period of anti-dependency in 
the early 1960s, a military regime took control 
of Argentina in 1966. The regime brought with 
it a different style of laissez-faire policy, one in 
which the government actually repressed the 
universities and organizations dealing in tech-
nology advancement by not funding them and 
not giving them the necessary resources need-
ed to continue their research. In this new lais-
sez-faire policy, while the government still took 
very few steps to control the importation of 
technology into the country, it also tried to 
restrain local companies and organizations 
from developing new technology themselves. 
This new policy began a confrontation that 
defines Argentina's recent technological histo-
ry. Those in favor of a strong science and tech-
nology program and firm restrictions on the 
transfer of technology into Argentina are 
opposed by those in favor of a more relaxed pro-
gram by which technology can be brought 
cheaply and easily into the country. (Adler, 
pp. 108-ll) 
The history of Argentina's technology poli-
cies from then on is very erratic, in direct cor-
relation with its political history. From 1969 to 
1972 the government tried to establish anoth-
er anti-dependency program. However, due to 
bureaucratic problems stemming from sporadic 
governmental opposition, the program was not 
instituted until September 1973 when Juan 
Peron regained the presidency. Peron tried to 
establish a strong anti-dependency program by 
enacting tough new measures against foreign 
technology transfer into Argentina. However, at 
the time the country was in such serious finan-
cial difficulty that it lacked the ability to effec-
tively start a new domestic technology program. 
Peron's half-year in office was not enough time 
to establish the new program, and in 1976 new 
counter-nationalist anti-dependency policies 
were set up and a laissez-faire technology 
accumulation policy again took hold. From 
1976 to the late 1980s and early 1990s a lack of 
interest and attention to the development of 
technology in Argentina led to a fairly stable 
laissez-faire policy. (Adler, pp. ll1-13) 
Over the past five years, Argentina has 
undergone phenomenal economic changes with 
the opening up of its economy to foreign 
investors, the privatization of many industries 
and the substantial reduction of inflation. At 
first this meant an expansion of its former lais-
sez-faire policies; but in recent years Argentina 
has begun to develop its own technological 
infrastructure, one which will allow for effec-
tive domestic research and development. It is 
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hoped that a combination of these two former-
ly competing policies -laissez-faire and anti-
dependency- will thus help to build a stronger 
industrial base to support the new economy. 
Technology Development Policies 
The first step in integrating an anti-depen-
dency program with Argentina's former laisse-
faire policy is to develop a structure in which 
effective research and development can be con-
ducted domestically. The primary goal of 
Argentine technology development policies in 
recent years has been to link industry with the 
research being conducted. The research cen-
ters and industries must begin to work togeth-
er through programs set up by both the uni-
versities and other technology organizations, 
while also keeping in close communi-
cation with the government. (Magliano) 
Accomplishing this goal should be an easy task 
since industry, research organizations and uni-
versities all have a natural need to satisfy tech-
nological demand. Small and middle size com-
panies simply do not have the capital to buy 
new technology, so they need the universities 
in order to face the challenge of the interna-
tional markets. (Magliano) The government 
has also convinced many of the larger compa-
nies, which may not benefit as much from uni-
versity assistance, to get involved in domestic 
research programs. Both international com-
panies, such as IBM, and domestic privatized 
companies, such as YPF (the recently privatized 
oil and gas company in Argentina), are involved 
in organizations to help develop domestic tech-
nology and create an Argentine technological 
infrastructure. (Magliano) However, other 
companies refuse to participate in these new 
programs for fear that they will not profit from 
the enterprise. For example, Bunge and Born, 
the largest holding company in Argentina, sees 
no need to develop technology when it is so easy 
and cheap to purchase from world markets. 
(Sturezenbaum) 
In the next few sections I will explain the 
various research organizations established in 
Argentina today. I will then proceed to explain 
the efforts being made to coordinate these orga-
nizations with the government. 
Financing of Research 
Organizations 
One of the ways in which governments 
maintain laissez-faire policies is by not finan-
cially supporting university and industrial 
research programs. In Argentina the financing 
of public technology development organizations, 
institutions and agencies (such as the University 
of Buenos Aires) has not always been at the top 
of the government's agenda. For example, in 
1988 Finalidad 8, the science and technology 
item of the government's budget, was only allo-
cated $380 million. While $50 million went to 
the privatization of public companies, ninety 
percent of the remaining budget was allocated 
to eight institutions and agencies. Although the 
universities are getting a larger share of funds 
today, in 1988 only $30 million was allotted to 
university research. (Adler, p. 127) The univer-
sity system, along with some other research 
organizations that received government fund-
ing, will be further discussed below. 
Argentine Research and 
Development Organizations 
CNEA (The Atomic Energy Commission) 
traditionally receives the largest portion of 
money going to the research agencies because 
of Argentina's strong military tradition. Only 
recently have modest cutbacks in the funding 
for CNEA begun to develop due to the discov-
ery of some large untapped natural gas reserves 
in the country. These gas reserves are lessen-
ing the demand for atomic energy. The goal of 
CNEA in the past had been to develop 
Argentina's atomic technology on its own. A 
disturbed political history has brought about a 
variety of policy changes throughout the years, 
making joint research on such a volatile sub-
ject as nuclear energy very difficult. More 
recently, however, CNEA has done what most 
other technology development sectors have 
done: it has gone abroad, but not just to pur-
chase technology. Many CNEA scientists have 
traveled abroad to train in physics, metallurgy, 
radiobiology and material sciences. Also, in 
recent years Argentina has formed a number of 
joint ventures with foreign private firms, espe-
cially in Germany and the United States, to pro-
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duce atomic energy in Argentina. (Nelson, 
pp. 467-68) 
In 1958 CONICET (The National Council 
for Science and Technology) was established "to 
coordinate and promote scientific and techno-
logical research and to advise the national gov-
ernment on such matters." (Adler, p. 106) In its 
early years CONICET was ineffective because it 
had no decision-making power and was reduced 
to acting as an advisory board to the government 
officials. However, as it grew the organization 
became mor.e proactive. One way in which 
CONICET has tried to pursue its goals is by 
awarding fellowships for studying abroad to both 
university students and professors. (Adler, pp. 
106-107) Perhaps the council's most significant 
accomplishment came in 1985 when it set up a 
Technology Transfer Office, which was designed 
to help link research institutions with compa-
nies in need of research and development. 
Today, CONICET is active in fashioning many 
new contracts in such areas as petrochemicals 
and biotechnology both between firms and 
between research agencies. (Nelson, p. 467) 
Two other government organizations were 
created to help propagate technology develop-
ment in industry and agriculture. INTI (The 
National Institute for Industrial Technology) 
was formed in 1957 with a goal of "providing 
technical services to industry through labora-
tories and a network of research centers." 
(Adler, p. 107) Most of the financing for this 
organization comes from a 0.25 percent tax on 
all bank credits to industry. Financial assis-
tance was supposed to be a goal of the organi-
zation originally; however, that aspect never 
unfolded. (Adler, p. 107) The other organiza-
tion created to help propagate technology devel-
opment is INTA (The National Institute for 
Agricultural Technology), and it is INTI's agri-
cultural counterpart. It is the charge of this 
organization "to promote and coordinate 
research in the agricultural sector through a 
complex network of research stations." (Adler, 
p. 107) Financing for regional experimental 
farms and the thirty research programs that 
INTA helps support comes from a 1.5 percent 
tax on all agricultural exports. (Adler, p. 107) 
In recent years, INTA has been trying to pro-
mote the development of more hybrids and pes-
ticides. In the past, a lack of technological 
development in these areas has allowed large 
multinational firms to dominate. Although 
INTA has not yet exploited world markets, it has 
had some success with more efficient imple-
mentation of agricultural equipment, produc-
tion of organic technology, production of new 
fertilizers, development of new agrochemicals, 
and harvesting of new crops, such as soybeans. 
INTA has also helped to save the Argentine 
small farmer in a time of large company dom-
inance by promoting the subcontracting of 
farming by larger agricultural companies. 
(Nelson, pp. 468-69) 
The University System and 
Technology Development 
Perhaps the most important organization 
concerning the future of Argentina's technolo-
gy development infrastructure is the universi-
ty system. It should be noted that the univer-
sity system in Argentina is a public system in 
which the universities are on average much 
larger than in the United States. The largest 
university in Argentina is the University of 
Buenos Aires , which services more than 
120,000 students. 
The university system first became 
involved in the redevelopment of the technol-
ogy system by reorganizing the structure of 
research programs. The first step in this reor-
ganization was to change university policies to 
allow university researchers to perform 
research for private companies rather than just 
for their own interests. This step, which was 
accomplished in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
allowed the universities to abandon the pursuit 
of nonproductive but interesting research, and 
instead to begin conducting research that 
would be directly applicable in the engineering 
field. The universities were also required to 
define their specific faculties. As an example, 
the University of Buenos Aires set up the fol-
lowing 13 faculties: Facultad de Agronomfa, 
Facultad de Arquitectura, Facultad de Ciencias 
Econ6micas, Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y 
Naturales , Facultad de Ciencias Sociales , 
Facultad de Ciencias Veterinarias, Facultad de 
Derecho, Facultad de Facultad de Farmacia y 
Bioqufmica, Facultad de Filosoffa, Facultad de 
Ingenieria, Facultad de Medicina, Facultad de 
19 
Odontologfa and Facultad de Psicologfa. Each 
of these faculties has also set up various pro-
grams of research within its own faculty. 
(Magliano) 
Integrating the Government, the 
Industry and the University System 
A very significant accomplishment of the 
University of Buenos Aires in recent years is the 
establishment of an organization called 
UBATEC S.A. (University of Buenos Aires 
Technology). The goal of this organization, 
which was founded in 1992, is to unify the aca-
demic, business and municipal sectors of the 
technology environment and to profitably 
transfer technology through the Transfer of 
Technology Network. Unifying these sectors 
includes providing better avenues of commu-
nication and better means of working together 
to accomplish mutual goals. UBATEC, a private 
company, is the managing partner for four 
other associations: UBA (University of Buenos 
Aires), UIA (Industry Union Argentina) , CCI 
(General Confederation of Industry) and 
M.C.B.A. (Municipality of the City of Buenos 
Aires). The UIA represents larger enterprises, 
while the CCI is an agent for smaller, less-well-
known companies. UBATEC S.A. is the first 
organization of its kind to organize all sectors 
of the technology environment in Argentina. 
Organizations such as CONICET, INTA and INTI 
have been trying to develop their own specific 
interests for years, but have not succeeded in 
unifying the technology environment as a 
whole. (Magliano) 
Technology Transfer Policies 
The goal for technology development in 
most countries is not to become totally 
autonomous, but rather to maximize the level 
of efficiency in the accumulation of technolo-
gy. In many cases, therefore, it is worthwhile to 
gain technology from a source outside the 
country itself as well as to develop domestic 
technology. There are many advantages to 
acquiring technology from foreign countries, 
such as cost effectiveness, complexity of knowl-
edge and speed of acquisition. (Sturezenbaum) 
Modes of Transferring Technology 
Although advantageous, acquiring tech-
nology from foreign countries can be very com-
plicated. Transferring technology from one 
country to another does not simply mean buy-
ing and selling information. Actually, there are 
seven modes of transferring technology as 
described by Emanual Adler in his book, The 
Power of Ideology, three of which deal with the 
transfer of knowledge. Technical assistance, the 
first of the modes, involves assigning foreign 
experts to local research and development 
groups, as well as sending domestic experts 
abroad to gain knowledge that they may bring 
back to a local project. Technical assistance can 
be accomplished by forming joint ventures, by 
directly investing with foreign companies or by 
contracting with foreign organizations. The 
United Nations Development Program, the 
World Bank and many private foundations are 
involved in financing projects such as these. 
(Adler, pp. 54-57) Numerous instances of this 
type of transfer of knowledge are present in 
Argentina today. The university system is set-
ting up programs to send both students and 
professors overseas to universities such as MIT 
and Harvard. The University of Buenos Aires 
has also set up a National Interuniversity 
Council, which directs the operation of thirty 
national universities in foreign countries. 
(Adler, pp. 54-55) There are also multination-
al companies, such as Arthur Andersen 
Consulting, that send people all over the world 
to train and then return them back to Argentina 
to work. Many of these large multinational 
companies have also been helped in the trans-
fer of technology by the new CD-ROM instru-
ments and personal computers. (Vazquez) It is 
now much easier to send technology to less 
developed countries such as Argentina. 
The second technique for transferring 
knowledge is through the purchase of knowl-
edge-generating capital equipment. Even 
though the equipment is bought from a foreign 
country, it must be maintained within the 
country that purchased the equipment. 
Through the maintenance and operation of this 
equipment a pool of knowledge develops in the 
specific areas. This technique has been used by 
the telecommunications industry during the 
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recent privatization of ENTEL (the Argentine 
telephone company) and also in the develop-
ment of shipyard equipment. (Adler, p. 55) 
The actual purchase of technology is the 
final means for the transfer of knowledge. In 
this case, local companies must first acquire the 
rights to foreign patents. Acquiring these rights 
may be complicated because each country has 
its own patent laws, and many countries have 
only recently begun developing laws to regu-
late the transfer of patents across internation-
al borders. It also may be hard to locate coun-
tries willing to sell advanced technology. (Adler, 
p. 55) In 1993 Argentina signed a pact with the 
United States government in which Argentina 
would place more controls on its strategic 
exports. In return the United States agreed to 
sell sophisticated computer equipment, nuclear 
technology and aeronautical-guidance systems 
to Argentina. ("Technology Pact...," p. 215) 
The next three ways in which technology 
is transferred are each characterized by the 
obtaining of capital goods from foreign coun-
tries. For example, an Argentine company may 
purchase the parts to a product abroad, but 
assemble the final product at home. Although 
this process does not transfer much techno-
logical knowledge, it does increase the demand 
for other newly developed products at home 
that are needed to complement the foreign 
products. The automobile industry in Argentina 
is a prime example of how imported foreign 
products may spur the development of new 
technology at home. Bringing to Argentina the 
original equipment for the automobile facto-
ries from foreign countries created the incen-
tive to gain more domestic knowledge about 
the industry, thus increasing domestic auto-
motive technological development. Not only is 
it cheaper to develop Argentine automobile 
products similar to foreign products, but it is 
also cheaper to develop Argentine replacement 
parts for the original imported equipment. 
(Adler, pp. 55-56) 
Another (and more common) technique 
of gaining capital equipment that brings about 
greater use of domestic technology involves the 
contribution of both foreign and domestic parts 
to a finished product. This technique encour-
ages Argentine companies to use the guidance 
of foreign and multinational firms to help devel-
op capital equipment in their own country, 
without excluding the companies' own 
researchers and developers. (Adler, p. 56) 
The final technique involved in gaining 
technology through capital equipment from 
abroad does not include the transfer of capital 
equipment parts to Argentina, but rather the 
transfer of total systems. Multinational firms 
will develop the system overseas and then ship 
it to Argentina. These systems can include any-
thing from new computer systems to whole fac-
tories or power plants. (Adler, p. 56) For 
instance, Whirlpool of Argentina bought an 
entire factory, including the machinery, from a 
Brazilian company to produce two-door refrig-
erators. (Carelli) 
The last way in which Adler sees technol-
ogy being transferred is through joint ventures. 
Joint ventures here usually involve a national 
and multinational firm working together to 
establish a company in Argentina. After the 
company has successfully been established, 
which may include transfer of both capital 
equipment and technological knowledge, the 
foreign company pulls out and allows the 
national firm to take over all operations. (Adler, 
pp. 56-57) 
In most cases multinational as well as 
national firms use a combination of the above 
seven techniques to transfer technology to 
Argentina. For instance, Bunge and Born pur-
chases the machinery for empanadas, which are 
a favorite Argentinean food, from Japan. Both 
transfer-of-product and maintenance-of-equip-
ment techniques are utilized by this purchase. 
Bunge and Born also utilizes technical assis-
tance techniques by working with experts in 
Australia to develop what it calls "perfect" pork 
cold-cuts. (Sturezenbaum) 
The University System's Technology 
Transfer Organization 
Whatever technology transfer techniques 
are implemented, they must be used in accor-
dance with Argentina's technology transfer poli-
cies. As mentioned earlier, throughout 
Argentina's history policies have changed from 
ones in which technology transfer from foreign 
countries was encouraged to ones in which it 
was discouraged. As in the case with develop-
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mental policies, there has been a lack of com-
munication between the industry and govern-
ment regarding transfer policies. (Magliano) 
The University of Buenos Aires recognized 
the problem and has come up with a solution. 
In 1985 the university became involved in the 
transfer of technology by setting up a new office 
for the purpose of increasing communication 
between the government and industry. Its most 
significant achievement so far has been to help 
formulate a new transfer-of-technology law, 
which was enacted in 1990. This new law keeps 
the transfer of technology relatively open by 
allowing a great deal of freedom to import to 
international firms working in Argentina. 
However, in light of the need to integrate both 
domestic and foreign technology, the new law 
has also allocated funds in the national budget 
for companies to hire both public and private 
groups to develop needed technology. 
(Magliano) 
Conclusion 
Good communication, high quality 
research organizations, and well-developed 
technology policies are the building blocks 
upon which Argentina is developing its new 
technological infrastructure. UBATEC and the 
University of Buenos Aires' technology transfer 
office have established a viable communications 
system among industry, research organizations, 
the universities and government. This new 
communications system has allowed the gov-
ernment to institute strong policies governing 
the development and transfer of technology in 
Argentina today. In turn, research organiza-
tions are beginning to develop more effective 
ways of conducting research essential to indus-
try, rather than merely to the interests of the 
researchers themselves. 
A key to the success of the new policies 
adopted by the Argentine government is the 
integration of developmental and transferal 
policies. The new open economic policies have 
allowed many multinational companies to 
establish themselves in Argentina, bringing 
with them their own technology. With an open 
economic policy, the transfer of technology will 
occur whether or not the national government 
has strong developmental policies of its own. 
As a result, the Argentine government has 
decided to pursue both modes of accumulation 
of technology. It has also realized that these 
two policies are not necessarily conflicting. 
Many of the transfer-of-technology techniques 
discussed include ways in which new technol-
ogy could be developed in Argentina. Joint ven-
tures, in particular, allow Argentina to receive 
assistance in developing its own technology, 
while preventing foreign firms from becoming 
the dominant factor in this process. 
If the development and transfer of tech-
nology in Argentina continues along these 
same lines, the technology infrastructure will 
eventually catch up to the progressing econo-
my. The building blocks have been set in place, 
and now the actions that these new policies are 
governing must be well executed. One of the 
major obstacles to the development of an 
Argentine technology infrastructure in the 
past has been an unstable government. 
Menem's new government appears stable so far, 
which has resulted in a solid economy, thus giv-
ing a chance for firm technology policies and 
the development of a strong technological 
infrastructure. 
REFERENCES 
Adler, Emanual. The Power of Idealogy: The Quest for 
Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. 
Carelli , Victor. Interview, Whirlpool , Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, August 24, 1994. 
Magliano, Ora. Marta Mas de. Interview, University of Buenos 
Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 24, 1994. 
Sturezenbaum, Enrique C. Interview, Bunge & Born, 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 23, 1994. 
22 
Nelson, Richard R. National Innovation Systems: A 
Comparative Analysis. Oxford: University of Oxford 
Press, 1993, pp. 451-473. 
"Technology Pact Signed with U.S." Facts on File, Volume 
53, Number 2730, March 25, 1993, p. 215 
Vazquez, E. Mario. Interview, Arther Anderson Consulting, 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 22, 1994. 
